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The Effect of Incongruent Information on Schematic Processing
in Person Memory
Schema theory, a concept proposed by Bartlett (1932), 
has recently been adopted by social psychologists seeking a 
cognitive approach to a variety of phenomena, including 
attitude change (Wyer and Hartwick, 1980), attraction 
(Tesser and Reardon, 1981), and stereotyping (Linville and 
Jones, 1980). In a speculative paper demonstrating the 
range of applications of schema theory to social psycholo­
gical issues, Taylor and Crocker (1981) presented possible 
reinterpretations of past findings in terms of schema 
theory. Their approach suggested that attitudinal biases 
may be explained as artifacts of attentional and memorial 
processes, rather than of traditionally conceived components 
of attitudes, including affect. Despite its intuitive 
appeal and general utility, schema theory had two related 
weaknesses in its original form; it was over-explanatory, 
supporting contradictory predictions; and it lacked a pro­
cessing model (Fiske and Linville, 1980).
The essential characteristic of schematic processing is 
that incoming events or stimuli are categorized on the basis
of prior experience, providing organization to the elements 
of the stimulus and expectancies about additional character­
istics of the stimulus configuration. Both the expectancies 
and the organization of information should facilitate encod­
ing and memory of the event. Schema theory, therefore, 
provides a constructivist perspective on social processes, 
and accounts for normative aspects of social behavior and 
perceptions on the basis of information processing heuris­
tics rathern than positing emotional or motivational con­
structs.
A question that suggests itself given this view of 
social processes is: At what point might an inapplicable
schema lose its utility as an information processing 
heuristic and be abandoned? Whether incongruent information 
will produce this effect is also a case in which schema 
theory can generate contradictory predictions. As Wyer and 
Gordon (1982) note, information that is incongruent with an 
activated schema is distinctive and may be deeply processed 
(Craik and Lockhart, 1972), two factors which would render 
disconfirming information salient and memorable. The 
availability of incongruent information could contribute to 
the breakdown of the schema. On the other hand, in Taylor 
and Crocker's (1981) presentation, the schema filters out 
irrelevant and incongruent information, or, when incon­
gruencies are encoded, they are construed as special cases 
and result in subcategories within the schema. In their
view, the schema seems to be immune to invalidation.
Much recent research has explored this issue by 
measuring memory of congruent and incongruent information 
introduced after activation of a person schema. Many 
studies have found that schema incongruent information is 
remembered better than congruent information (Hamilton and 
Gifford, 1976; Hastie and Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981; Hastie 
and Mazur, Note 2) but some others have found that con­
gruent information is remembered better (Rothbart, Evans and 
Pulero, 1979 ; Snyder and Uranowitz, 1978; Cohen, Note 1; 
Johnson and Judd, Note 3). More importantly, this research 
has generated two schematic processing models. Hastie (1980) 
has proposed an associative network model based on HAM and 
FRAN (Anderson, 1973; Anderson and Bower, 1973), and Smith 
and Graesser (1981) have proposed application of Schank and 
Abelson's (1977) script-pointer + tag model. These applica­
tions were particularly designed to account for the treat­
ment of schema incongruent information in memory. Both 
models predict that incongruent information will be more 
memorable than congruent information in immediate recall or 
recognition, and data are presented to support the pre­
dictions.
However, the true measure of the limits of schematic 
processing (and of the two models) would not be demonstrated 
by recall of incongruencies, but by some effect of these 
incongruencies on the schema itself. In studies of discon-
firming information in person memory, although it has often 
been found that incongruent items are remembered better than 
congruent items, trait rating scales administered subsequent 
to the memory tests reflect schema congruent information 
primarily (cf. Hastie and Kumar, 1979; Carlston, 1980); 
remembered incongruencies do not appear to influence schema­
tic processing to the extent that impressions are altered by 
them. Thus false encouragement may have been taken from the 
simple memorability of the disconfirming information. For 
example. Clore (1982) notes that if deviant assertions 
require more processing, and are therefore more memorable, 
the stage is set for cognitive change. Yet does it occur? 
Answering this question involves looking at more than the 
treatment of disconfirming information in memory; it also 
involves investigating the effect of the disconfirming 
information on the schema itself.
The current research focuses on the effect of incon­
gruent information on schematic processing in the domain of 
social stereotypes. By investigating memory of congruent 
information in the face of disconfirming information, we 
may be able to discover the processes underlying the strange 
discrepancy between the memorability of disconfirming infor­
mation and its inefficacy in altering the effects of cate­
gorization and schematic processing. In Experiment 1, sub­
jects were presented with stereotypical characters followed 
by two levels of congruent information (consistent and
inconsistent) , crossed with two levels of relevance to the 
schema (core and peripheral) and an irrelevant item. Recall 
of the original schematic information was tested either 
immediately or two days later. Although Hastie's (1980) 
network associational model and Smith and Graesser's (1981) 
script-pointer + tag model are equally able to account for 
the superior memory of incongruent information, the proposed 
models support different hypotheses for the results of this 
experiment.
Hastie's (1980) Model
Hastie's model was formulated on the basis of several 
studies he and his colleagues had conducted. In this 
research, subjects were presented with several trait adjec­
tives, intended to activate the schema, followed by behav­
iors that were congruent and incongruent with the traits.
In Hastie and Mazur (Note 2) and Hastie and Kumar (1979), 
level of incongruency (high, medium, and low) and propor­
tions of congruent to incongruent items were varied ("set 
sizes" were 9:1, 7:3, and 5:5). They found superior recall 
of moderately or highly incongruent items to congruent items 
when there were fewer incongruent than congruent items. 
Hastie (1980) concluded that behaviors are remembered when 
they are highly informative, and they are highly informative 
when they are either highly prototypical, infrequent, or 
highly incongruent.
The model Hastie proposes to account for the memor­
ability of highly informative events has a short term 
memory, working memory, and long term memory, and preposi­
tional networks. The probability of recall of an item is a 
function of the number of linkages it has to other items. 
Linkages are established between any two items when they 
make contact in short term or working memory. For two items 
to become linked, they must not merely cohabit working 
memory, but a process Hastie considers analogous to Craik 
and Lockhart's (1972) elaborative processing must take 
place. Under this model, the reason highly incongruent 
items are well remembered is that they require elaborative 
processing, including causal attribution, to be understood. 
In the course of this reasoning, incongruent items become 
extensively linked to other items.
The paradigm to be used here is similar to Hastie's in 
that a schema will be activated and congruent or incongruent 
information will be presented subsequently. It is different 
in that, for any particular schema, only congruent siX. incon­
gruent information will follow; and recall of the original 
expectancy-inducing information will be measured, rather 
than focusing on recall of the subsequent congruent or 
incongruent items. Applying Hastie's model to this para­
digm, schematic information that is followed by highly 
incongruent information should be remembered better than 
schematic information that is followed by highly congruent 
information. According to Hastie's description, the intro­
duction of highly incongruent information instigates a 
review of stored information. This review involves elabora­
tion of and causal reasoning about the incongruent item, in 
the context of schematic information. In this case, the 
stored (schematic) information would have more linkages, 
especially to the incongruent item, than stored schematic 
information that was simply followed by additional congruent 
information.
Hastie has also found that the retention interval has 
no differential effects on recall of congruent and incon­
gruent items. Since all linkages are assumed to decay at 
the same rate, better memory for incongruent than congruent 
items is still found after a delay. Therefore, for the 
current research, this model predicts persistence of the 
facilitating effect of disconfirming information on recall 
of schematic information.
Another difference between the two models is the pur­
ported relationship of high and low relevance items to 
schematic information, and such a variable was included in 
Experiment 1. One can predict from Hastie's model that the 
facilitating effect of incongruencies will be restricted to 
the highly relevant (core) incongruent items, which should 
be best remembered and benefit recall of preceding informa­
tion. Peripheral incongruent items, like his low incon­
gruent items, should be less memorable and should not faci­
litate recall of schematic information because they would
not be evaluated as informative. Core congruent items 
should be remembered well themselves, because "quintessen- 
tially characteristic" items also receive deep processing, 
but they should not benefit recall of previous schematic 
information because they do not require retrieval of stored 
information for comprehension. Peripheral congruent items 
should be supremely forgettable and have no effect on the 
schema. Therefore, incongruencies which are peripheral to 
the schema should be 'filtered out' as Taylor and Crocker 
(1981) propose, but central incongruencies should be dis­
tinctive and deeply processed, as Wyer and Gordon (1982) 
propose.
These predictions indicate that Hastie's model, which 
seems to suggest that expectations might be altered and 
schemas broken down because of continued high availability 
of disconfirming information, also suggests that the very 
discrediting of a schema strengthens it by making supportive 
information more memorable. Perhaps this is the answer to 
the puzzle Clore (1982) raises: given the deeper processing
and accurate recall of deviant statements, "why are we not 
constantly in cataclysms of cognitive change?" (p. 767). It 
could be that encountering deviancy renders normative infor­
mation more available.
Smith and Graesser's .(19.81) Jflpd.el
Reformulation of Schank and Abelson's (1977) script- 
pointer + tag model as a more general schema-pointer + tag
model had previously been suggested by Graesser, Woll, 
Kowalski and Smith (1980). Smith and Graesser (1981) tested 
this reformulation. In their presentation, the memory re­
presentation of a schematic event has "a pointer to the 
generic schema that interrelates both the stated and infer­
red very typical actions as a whole... [which] implies that 
the schema is accessed in an all-or-none manner and that 
most or all of the schema-relevant information is copied 
into the specific memory trace..." (p. 551). Actions that 
are not very typical are tagged. Depending on the con­
gruency of the tagged information with the schema, the tag 
appears in one of two places: moderately typical items are
individually linked to the block of generic schema items; 
atypical items are directly linked to the memory trace.
Thus moderately typical items are tagged under the pointer, 
but atypical items are tagged under the memory trace with no 
direct connection to the pointer.
Two types of retrieval processes are proposed in con­
junction with the model. Recall is guided by conceptually 
driven retrieval, which utilizes organized strategies in 
which the schema plays a role. Recognition is guided by 
conceptually driven retrieval, and by data driven retrieval 
which relies on cues providing direct access to the item in 
memory.
The predictions from this model for recognition 
are straightforward: atypical items should be recognized
better than typical items because they are tagged. The 
predictions for recall are more complex. In immediate re­
call, atypical items will benefit from the discriminability 
of tagged items while highly typical items will be confused 
with inferences provided by the generic schema. When res­
ponses are corrected for guessing, according to Smith and 
Graesser (1981), atypical items are remembered better than 
typical items. This relationship is reversed with delayed 
recall. As the retention interval increases, retrieval 
becomes more dependent upon the generic schema, memory 
becomes more reconstructive, and recall of typical items is 
superior to atypical items.
The primary hypothesis that can be generated from this 
model for the current research is that the addition of 
incongruent information should not affect recall of sche­
matic information. Atypical tagged items have no other 
relationship to the schematic information than that they are 
part of the same memory trace. They are not directly con­
nected to the schema. Only congruent items are related to 
the schema. Highly congruent items, whether given to estab­
lish the schema or subsequently, should become part of the 
generic schema information and should be easily recalled 
because they will be under the pointer. They should also be 
recalled if any other schematic information is retrieved 
because the schema is accessed in an all-or-none fashion.
Retention interval should affect relative recall rates
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of the congruent and incongruent items themselves, but it is 
difficult to conceive of a way that remembering or forget­
ting these items might affect the schematic information.
All the tagged items should be remembered more successfully 
than the core congruent item under immediate recall, but 
these items should decay more rapidly and the core congruent 
item should be remembered best under delayed recall.
There should be no difference among core incongruent, 
peripheral incongruent, and neutral items in recall or in 
their effect on the schema. All three item types would be 
represented as atypical tags under the memory trace. It is 
not necessary to distinguish among them under Smith and 
Graesser’s (1981) model, because only schema relevant and 
congruent items are related to the schema and benefit from 
conceptually driven retrieval.
Peripheral congruent items, however, might behave dif­
ferently from the other types of tagged items because they 
are related to the schema. They can be expected to be 
recalled better than core consistent items under immediate 
recall because they are tagged, but they might not decay as 
rapidly as other tagged items because of their relationship 
to the generic schema. It is also possible that they could 
enhance recall of the original schematic information by 
making it more discriminable because they are tagged onto 
the schema itself. If the peripheral congruent item does 
facilitate immediate recall of schematic information by
11
tagging it, this effect should diminish under delayed recall 
because the peripheral congruent tag will be less accessible 
over time, although perhaps decaying at a slower rate than 
other tagged items. The precise treatment and effect of the 
peripheral consistent item may not be clear, but any finding 
that the peripheral consistent item behaves differently from 
atypical items as a group would tend to favor Smith and 
Graesser's (1981) model over Hastie's (1980).
The script-pointer + tag model and the network associa­
tional model are equally able to account for the persistence 
of schemas in the face of memorable disconfirming informa­
tion, but do so in a very different manner. Under the 
script-pointer + tag model, an inappropriate schema might 
persist because it is an intact unit to which only suppor­
tive information is added, and recall of schematic informa­
tion is assisted by a pointer. Incongruent information is 
memorable only because it is tagged, not by virtue of a 
special relationship to the schema. It is to be expected, 
under this model, that incongruent items would not affect 
trait ratings because they are separate from the schematic 
information. In any case, this high memorability of incon­
gruent information is short-lived, and could have no lasting 
effect on the schema.
Because the two models describe different relationships 
between incongruent and schematic information, they engender 
different hypotheses for the current research. The network
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associational model proposed by Hastie (1980) suggests that 
initial information establishing and highly congruent with a 
schema should be remembered better when it is followed by a 
highly incongruent item than when it is followed by a con­
gruent or moderately incongruent item. It also predicts 
that this pattern should hold with delayed recall. Smith 
and Graesser's script-pointer + tag model predicts that 
recall of highly congruent information should not be 
affected by the level of congruence or relevance of subse­
quent information, with the possible exception of peripheral 
congruent information having a facilitating effect with 
immediate recall. It also predicts that this pattern of 
equivalent memory of schematic information across conditions 
should hold with delayed recall.
The competing hypotheses from these two models will be 
tested in Experiment 1. Prior to introducing Experiment 1, 
a factor that was considered of importance to the outcome of 
the experiment, development of experimental stimuli, will be 
discussed. It was deemed critical to use materials that 
would be likely to evoke the intended schema in the labora­
tory, and about which subjects had high levels of agreement. 
It was also neccesary to determine the organization of the 
schemas to develop core and peripheral consistent and incon­
sistent items. Since the outcome of procedures used to 
elicit materials resulted in a different conceptualization 
of the internal structure of person schemas than has been
13
adopted elsewhere, the procedures used to develop experimen­
tal stimuli will be described in some detail.
14
Development of Materials
The first consideration in developing experimental 
materials was choosing a domain for which subjects would 
exhibit high levels of common knowledge. We thought there 
would be much shared social knowledge among the subject 
population of first and second year college students about 
the categories of students, their attributes, and how they 
were designated. This choice made the research relevant to 
the accumulating literature on person memory and proposed 
cognitive models. Before beginning Experiment 1, three 
procedures were performed to develop materials. The first 
procedure was designed to elicit stereotype categories 
salient to the subject population; the purpose of the second 
procedure was to elicit the attributes associated with the 
stereotypes; and the third procedure was performed to deter­
mine the relative importance of these attributes to each 
stereotype.
From the data elicited in these procedures, five 
stereotypical characters were created. Each was labeled 
with a stereotype category name, and credited with two of the 
attributes highly characteristic of that stereotype. These 
five stereotypes were rotated through five conditions of 
materials, determined by the levels of consistency (consis­
tent and inconsistent) and relevance (core and peripheral) 
of additional information. The preliminary procedures
15
described in this chapter also yielded data about the cen­
trality of attributes for creating the materials conditions.
Stereotype schemas were elicited from three groups of 
students drawn from the same population as subjects in 
Experiment 1. All subjects were 21 years old or younger and 
had resided in a dormitory on campus at the University of 
Oklahoma for a semester during the preceding year (1980- 
1981).
The purpose of the first phase was to determine the 
most frequent stereotype categories. Thirty subjects (15 
females and 15 males) were first asked to think of eight 
types of people they were likely to meet on campus and to 
give a label to each type. When they had written down eight 
labels, they were asked to write six descriptors of each 
type under the label. In calculating category frequency from 
these responses, stereotypes were considered the same if 
they had the same label, synonymous labels (e.g., "Prat Rat" 
and "Greek"), or if the descriptors were the same across 
subjects (e.g., "Freaks", "Druggies" and "Hippies" shared 
three attributes consistently). Retaining the most fre­
quently given labels —  excluding Professor, the only non­
student category elicited —  Phase 1 yielded the following 
six stereotypes; Jocks, given by 87% of the subjects;
Greeks, given by 53%; Brains, 50%; Independents (nonGreeks), 
40%; and Jesus Freaks, 30%. (Another category. Foreigner, 
also had a frequency of 30% but there was lower agreement on
16
descriptors of this type than for Jesus Freaks.)
In the second phase, 30 subjects (15 males and 15 
females) were given the six category labels elicited in 
Phase 1 and asked to list eight characteristics of each 
type. Two judges determined equivalence of differently 
worded descriptions, and the eight most frequent attributes 
of each type were calculated, yielding a total of 48 attri­
butes for six stereotypes.
The 19 subjects (10 females and 9 males) who partici­
pated in the third phase were given the six stereotype 
labels from Phase 1 and a randomly ordered list of the 48 
attributes from Phase 2. They were asked to assign each 
attribute to a stereotype, exhausting the list of attributes 
without repetition. They were then asked to rank the eight 
attributes under each stereotype according to their impor­
tance in describing that type.
Analysis of responses in the third phase was used to 
determine the structure of the stereotype schemas for 
Experiment 1. The category Independent was eliminated after 
an initial analysis showed that 77% of the 48 attributes 
were listed under this label by at least three subjects, 
indicating that there was not a well defined stereotype of 
nonfraternity members. The remaining five stereotypes were 
subjected to an analysis of the cue value of attributes.
The formula used to calculate cue value was designed to 
capture the intent of Rosch and Mervis' (1975) "family
17
resemblance score", according to their conceptualization of 
the noncriterial structure of natural categories. Cantor 
and Mischel (1979), who extended this conceptualization to 
person categories, describe the family resemblance score as 
a weighted sum taking into account both degree of asso­
ciation of an attribute with a category, and the distinc­
tiveness of that association as compared with neighboring 
categories. Here, cue value was computed by taking the fre­
quency of association of an attribute with a stereotype 
(number of subjects who listed the attribute under that 
label), multiplying it by a weight (mean rank assigned to 
the attribute for a stereotype), then subtracting the fre­
quency of association with other stereotypes (as a measure 
of distinctiveness).
For each stereotype, there were either eight or nine 
attributes with a cue value greater than +10, out of a 
possible range of -9 to +152. The eight highest scoring 
attributes for each stereotype were divided into two groups: 
the highest four, termed "core"; and the lowest four, termed 
"peripheral". Using the ninth attribute when necessary, 
adjustments were made so that all stereotypes had roughly 
equal total cue values and the stronger and weaker attri­
butes roughly clustered into two groups of four (see Table 
1).
Core attributes, as determined by these procedures, were 
used in Experiment 1 both to establish the stereotype and to
18
create the Core Consistent and Inconsistent conditions, and 
peripheral attributes were used to create the Peripheral 
Consistent and Inconsistent conditions. The materials used 
differed, as a result of this approach, from those that have 
been used to establish, and to confirm or violate impres­
sions in previous experiments. Typically, a set of trait 
adjectives, such as "intelligent and kind", is given to 
establish the impression, and a set of behaviors which are 
consistent and inconsistent is given subsequently (cf., 
Hastie and Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981; Marmurek, Note 4). The 
reason for the widespread adoption of this procedure has 
been stated by Hamilton, Katz, and Leirer (1980) who also 
utilized it;
it is usually assumed that trait information is more 
abstract than, and probably inferred from, more concrete 
behavioral information: this suggests a hierarchical
structure of the cognitive representation, yet little 
is known about its nature, (p. 150)
The data from our elicitation procedures do not support this 
assumption about the structure of person categories. We 
find, on the contrary, that behaviors predominate but the 
proportion of traits increases at lower levels of organiza­
tion. Of the 20 core attributes, 75% are behaviors and 25% 
are traits; of the 20 peripheral attributes, 45% are beha­
viors and 55% are traits. Thus, in previous experiments 
where the level of consistency of attributes with types was
19
manipulated, the "incongruent behaviors" may have played a 
different role than intended. For example, Hastie and Mazur 
(Note 2) performed an experiment comparing recall of three 
levels of incongruent items (high, moderate and low) and one 
level of congruent items. It is possible that they manipu­
lated degree of incongruence, but not level of incongruence 
as determined by the actual hierarchical organization of the 
schema. Here, highly incongruent items are those which are 
incompatible with a central aspect of the schema, and low 
incongruent items are those which are incompatible with less 
central aspects: they are not bizarre behaviors, nor do
they contradict a previously mentioned trait; they are sim­
ply unexpected given previous information.
20
Experiment 1
In previous studies of incongruencies in person memory, 
expectancies were manipulated and memory of subsequently 
introduced congruent and incongruent behaviors was measured. 
Here, the initial expectancy-inducing information was held 
constant, subsequent consistent and inconsistent information 
was manipulated, and recall of the initial information was 
measured.
From the data elicited in the preliminary procedures, 
five basic stereotype frames were constructed in the form of 
fictional biographies of students. An initial paragraph 
introduced the character and established the stereotype.
Five conditions were created by following this paragraph 
with an additional highly relevant consistent item (Core 
Consistent), a highly relevant inconsistent item (Core In­
consistent) , a less critical consistent item (Peripheral 
Consistent), a less critical inconsistent item (Peripheral 
Inconsistent), or an irrelevant item (Neutral).
Each subject was exposed to five biographies, one from 
each condition, and asked to write down everything she or he 
remembered about each person, either immediately after 
hearing the fifth biography, or two days later. Recall of
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the stereotype labels and attributes was measured.
Method
One hundred fifty male and female subjects participated 
in the experiment in partial fulfillment of an introductory 
psychology course requirement. All were native born Ameri­
cans, under 21, and had resided in a university dormitory 
for at least one semester in the preceding year (1980-1981). 
Materials
Five biographies of fictional students were created 
representing the five stereotypes elicited previously. Each 
biography started with a name and a neutral fact (year in 
college). The next sentence labeled the character with one 
of the stereotype names (Label). Two more sentences des­
cribed the character as possessing the second and third core 
attributes of that stereotype (Two Supporting Facts). This 
paragraph constituted the first information presented to the 
subject to establish the stereotype.
The second information began with a sentence presenting 
either the first core attribute (+C); the opposite of that 
attribute, not necessarily in negative sentence form (-C); 
the eighth peripheral attribute (+P); or the opposite of 
that attribute (-P). A neutral condition was created by 
rotating a single irrelevant fact through all five biogra­
phies. The second paragraph concluded with two more 
neutral facts (e.g., hair color and town of origin within
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the state).
Twenty-five stimulus sets (given in Appendix A) were 
created by rotating each biography through the five 
materials conditions, with five orders of presentation for 
each assignment of materials to conditions. A tape 
recording was made of each stimulus set by a female experi­
menter, reading in an even tone and pace.
Resign
The design was a 2 (Consistent/Inconsistent) X 2 
(Core/Peripheral) X 2 (Immediate/Delay) factorial design 
with two repeated measures (levels of consistency and rele­
vance) and one between-subjects variable (retention 
interval). A neutral condition of materials was included in 
the experiment to provide a baseline measure or control 
condition, but was not included in the statistical analyses 
for significance because to have included a fifth condition 
would have precluded the two-way analysis for effects of 
congruence and relevance.
Procedure
The 75 subjects in the immediate recall condition were 
run individually, and the 75 subjects in the delayed recall 
condition were run in groups of three. Subjects were told 
they would hear descriptions of five University of Oklahoma 
students and be asked questions about them. The tape recor­
der was started and the first paragraph of the biography was 
played.
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After hearing the first information, subjects were 
asked to answer two questions on paper, one estimating the 
typicality of the student compared with other students at 
the university, and the second estimating the percentage of 
students at the university who were like this student. This 
interpolated judgment task was included after the initial 
information to ensure that subjects were attending to the 
tape and that the stereotype was established before incon­
sistent information was introduced.
After answering the two questions, subjects were told 
they would hear more information about the same person, and 
the remainder of the biography (second information) was 
played. Subjects then answered the two typicality questions 
again, about the same "student". They were told they could 
respond the same way as the first time, or differently. The 
interpolated task was repeated after presentation of the 
second information to avoid a procedurally induced bias 
toward recall of the initial, congruent information.
This procedure was repeated for five biographies. For 
subjects in the immediate recall condition, the incidental 
recall task was then introduced. Subjects were asked to 
write down everything they remembered about the five people. 
They were given five recall sheets, one at a time, with the 
name of the character at the top, in the same order as the 
tape presentations. After they had filled out the fifth 
sheet, they were given the option of filling out a sixth
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unlabeled sheet with any additional biography they remem­
bered. Subjects in the delayed recall condition returned 
two days later and followed the same procedure. (Instruc­
tions are given in Appendix B.)
Results
Each subject's recall responses were scored for three 
different measures: recall of the stereotype label? recall
of the two core "supporting facts" which followed the label 
in the first paragraph; and recall of the additional fact in 
the second paragraph ("second information") which determined 
the materials condition. Results were tabulated by condi­
tion, and separate statistical tests were performed on the 
three dependent measures. Each test was a 2 X 2 X 2 (con­
sistency X relevance x retention interval) mixed analysis of 
variance. Results of the three analyses will be discussed 
separately. All means are reported in Table 2, and ANOVAs 
are given in Appendix C.
For scoring purposes, stereotypes were identified by the 
label, or by core attributes in the absence of a label. 
Either verbatim or synonymous responses were considered 
correct for recall of the label. A supporting fact was con­
sidered correct unless given under the wrong stereotype 
label. Recall of the second information was counted if it 
occurred with the appropriate label and/or supporting facts, 
or if neither the label nor supporting facts was recalled 
elsewhere. Information on the optional sixth recall sheet
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was counted only if it introduced a stereotype which had not 
been recalled; if it merely added to an earlier description, 
it was not counted.
Recall of the Stereotype Label
Memory of the label was not affected by any of the inde­
pendent variables. Average recall of the label was 61% for 
subjects in the immediate recall condition, and 57% for 
subjects in the delayed recall condition. Mean recall for 
both congruent and incongruent conditions was 59%.
Recall-of the Two Supporting Facts
Recall of the two supporting facts in the first informa­
tion was the primary dependent measure used to test the 
effect of different levels of congruent and incongruent 
information on schematic processing. The ANOVA on the two 
supporting facts showed no significant main effects for the 
within-subjects variables, consistency and relevance, but 
there was a significant interaction: P(l, 148)=4.16,
MSe=.3852, g <.05. The two core facts in the first informa­
tion were best recalled when followed by highly incongruent 
information, and recall was poorest when the additional 
information was in the core consistent condition (see Figure 
1).
There was also a significant main effect for delay,
F(l, 148)=31.10, MSe=.6604, g < .001. Mean recall of the 
two supporting facts by subjects in the immediate recall 
condition was 1.21, while for subjects in the delayed recall
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condition it was .84.
Recall of the Second Information.
A tertiary analysis was performed on the second informa­
tion presented to subjects. Since this sentence from the 
second paragragh determined the experimental conditions, 
results of this analysis are confounded with linguistic 
factors and results should be viewed with caution. Nonethe­
less, we had some interest in recall of the consistent and 
inconsistent items themselves, in relation to their effect 
on the preceding information.
No interactions were significant, but all main effects 
were. Consistent information was remembered better than 
inconsistent information; F(l, 148)=5.62, MSe=.2322, p<.05. 
Recall of core facts was significantly better than recall of 
peripheral facts: F(l, 148)=42.0467, MSe=.1833, pc.OOl.
Immediate recall was superior to delayed recall: F (1,
148)=12.8134, MSe=.3252, g  <.001.
Discussion
Experiment 1 reported two findings that are germane to 
the issues in modeling schematic processing: first, recall
of the two supporting facts, but not the label, was affected 
by the level of consistency and relevance of the second 
information; and second, recall of the two supporting facts 
decayed at the same rate across conditions, while recall of 
the label was unaffected by retention interval in any con­
dition. An additional finding, involving the second infor­
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mation, was that congruent items were remembered better than 
incongruent items, and core items better than peripheral.
From Hastie's (1980) model, we had predicted that sche­
matic information would be remembered better when followed 
by incongruent information than by congruent information, 
and this prediction was upheld in analysis of the two 
supporting facts (but not the label). Smith and Graesser's 
(1981) model predicted that level of incongruency would not 
affect recall of schematic information; this prediction is 
not supported by analysis of the two supporting facts, but 
is by analysis of recall of the stereotype labels.
Hastie's model predicts that the patterns of recall will 
not be affected by the retention interval. Consistent with 
this prediction, we found that the two supporting facts 
decay at the same rate across conditions. Smith and 
Graesser's model predicts that some types of information 
will decay less rapidly than others. Specifically, informa­
tion under the generic schema should decay less rapidly than 
tagged information. Although it would be expected under 
this description that all schematic information, including 
the two supporting facts, would decay slowly, some support 
for this proposal is found in retention of the label.
Finally, both models allow for differences in memory of 
central versus peripheral information. The results of 
Experiment 1 support this common prediction with a main 
effect of superior recall of core second information. It
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was suggested that Smith and Graesser's different placement 
of the tag for peripheral consistent items as opposed to 
atypical tags might be manifested in some differential 
effect or memory of the peripheral consistent item as com­
pared to core and peripheral inconsistent items, or to 
neutral items. The means in Table 2 indicate little support 
for this supposition. The peripheral consistent item is 
remembered slightly but not significantly better than the 
peripheral inconsistent item, and its effect on the two 
supporting facts is the same as that of a neutral item.
Discussion of these findings will be organized in terms 
of the t wo pri m a r y  issues: what is the role of the schema
in memory? and, what effect do incongruencies have on sche­
matic processing?
Schematic Organization
Any differences found between core and peripheral items 
reflect application of the schema to incoming information. 
The core and peripheral items are not inherently different 
in informativeness; it is only in the context of a schema 
that they can be classified as highly relevant or unimpor­
tant. For example, "likes to party" is a peripheral attri­
bute of a Greek, but a core attribute (inconsistent) of a 
Jesus Freak, according to the procedures used to develop the 
materials. If the schemas did figure in the processing of 
the information presented to subjects, then there should be 
differences in the effect of introducing similar items in
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the context of two different stereotypes. We can infer from 
such differences that action of the schema at encoding must 
be included in the model.
The results show some confirmation of the predicted 
structural and processing differences. Core items were 
remembered significantly better than peripheral items. This 
finding is consistent with Hastie's principle of informa­
tiveness. However, although Hastie’s model is termed a 
schematic processing model (Srull, 1981), he does not 
explicitly provide for involvement of the schema. Smith and 
Graesser's pointer does provide a mechanism for representing 
the schema, and their model generally provides a more 
adequate account of schematic organization of new informa­
tion at encoding.
Core and peripheral inconsistent items had different 
effects on the processing of the initial information, as 
predicted from Hastie's model, but not from Smith and 
Graesser's. It seems that the primary distinction in sche­
matic processing is between highly relevant and less rele­
vant items, as Hastie proposes with his informativeness 
notion, rather than between highly congruent (i.e., 
predictable) and incongruent attributes, as in Smith and 
Graesser's representation. Therefore, although Smith and 
Graesser's model can account for schematic organization of 
new information, the particular organization they propose is 
not supported by the findings here.
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Additional evidence of schematic processing comes from 
examining recall of the label: that memory of the label
alone did not decay indicates that this information is 
somehow different from other kinds of information presented 
to the subjects. An apparent difference is that it is a 
nominative or subject, rather than a predicate or argument, 
as the other items were. The question remains how such 
nominative items are encoded or retrieved that prevents them 
from decaying at the same rate as attributes. One possi­
bility is Smith and Graesser's (1981) suggestion that items 
that do not decay as quickly as others are reached easily 
through concept-driven retrieval because they are part of 
the generic schema. Hastie's model does not clearly predict 
that the label will decay slowly, although the model can 
accommodate the finding. Given the methodology used in 
Experiment 1, it is highly likely that the stereotype label, 
rather than the character's name, would constitute the sub­
ject node in Hastie's prepositional network. In this case, 
it would be likely that any information retrieved about the 
character would be accessed through the label; and it would 
also mean that any particular item retrieved could lead back 
to the label.
This finding is interesting, however the label is repre­
sented, because the label is unique in that it may always be 
shared by the schema and the event memory. Other types of 
highly congruent information might or might not be present
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in any particular instance. Such items might be guessed or 
inferred by some subjects, but for schematic processing to 
take place, it may be that a label (categorization) is 
always inferred. In the retention of the label, then, we may 
be seeing the clearest evidence of the effect of the schema. 
If so, the high memorability of the label may be due to its 
special relationship to 'generic' information or semantic 
memory. It remains to be determined whether a mechanism 
like the pointer is necessary to represent the dual origin 
of the label from the experienced event and from semantic or 
conceptual memory.
Generally, we can conclude that the schema is evident in 
the evaluation of new information as relevant or irrelevant 
(core vs. peripheral and neutral); in evaluation of relevant 
information as consistent or inconsistent; and in the 
special tole of the schema label. Although Hastie's infor­
mativeness principle more successfully captures the per­
tinent organizational dimensions than Smith and Graesser's 
organizing principle of typicality, we find that Hastie has 
not explicated how the informativeness principle enters into 
the processing of schematic information.
££f£iLt siL Ingongruen.cies.
The core inconsistent item reliably facilitated recall 
of the two supporting facts. This finding provides clear 
support for Hastie's (1980) construction; after a prelimi­
nary evaluation to determine relevance to the schema, a
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highly relevant but incongruent item instigates retrieval of 
previous relevant information in an attempt to integrate and 
explain the incongruency.
There is a problem, however, with the mechanism Hastie 
proposes to account for the facilitating effects of elabora- 
tive processing. It is the core inconsistent item that 
becomes multiply linked, he explains, when it is compared 
with all other information. By this account, the two sup­
porting facts should have shown superior recall in the core 
inconsistent condition because they were connected to the 
eminently memorable core inconsistent item. However, 
superior recall of the core inconsistent item itself was not 
found. Therefore, while it seems that elaborative process­
ing instigated by the introduction of a highly relevant 
incongruency did facilitate recall of schematic information, 
this facilitation may not be best represented by linkages 
between the incongruent item and the two supporting facts.
We might tentatively consider the notion that review of the 
two supporting facts upon introduction of a core inconsis­
tency somehow integrated the schematic information, perhaps 
by establishing linkages (not otherwise present) between the 
two supporting facts.
In summary. Experiment 1 is found to support the notion 
of schemas generally, in that information is organized and 
amount of processing is determined with reference to rele­
vance and consistency of new information with the appro­
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priate schema. This organization conforms more to Hastie's 
description than to Smith and Graesser's, in that core items 
are remembered better than peripheral items whether consis­
tent or inconsistent, and only core items seem to affect 
processing. Peripheral consistent items are neither remem­
bered better than 'atypical' items, nor do they facilitate 
recall of schematic information more than atypical items, as 
might be predicted from Smith and Graesser's representation. 
Support might be found for Smith and Graesser's model in 
that recall of the label is unaffected by the retention 
interval, although Hastie's model can account for this find­
ing also if the label is regarded as the subject node 
through which all other information in the network is 
accessed.
Core inconsistencies do facilitate recall of schematic 
information as Hastie's model predicts, but the precise 
mechanism he proposes does not quite fit the data. The 
finding of superior recall of consistent to inconsistent 
items favors Smith and Graesser's proposal that consistent 
items should be remembered better because they are under the 
pointer, but the primary prediction from this model that 
such consistent items should decay more slowly than all 
other item types was not supported.
We can, in conclusion, tentatively adopt Hastie's model 
with three provisos; it apparently fails to account for how 
the schema enters the picture, and therefore how decisions
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of relevance and consistency are made; concommitantly, 
there is no account of how the schema might affect retention 
or retrieval, such that the schema label does not decay as 
rapidly as all other item types; and finally, the account of 
the facilitating effect of the core inconsistent item does 
not seem to be entirely accurate. We may tentatively adopt 
as a solution to the second problem Smith and Graesser's 
pointer to the label to prevent its rapid decay; and suggest 
in regard to the third problem that schema congruent infor­
mation is integrated when disconfirming information causes 
retrieval and elaborative processing of this information.
In order to investigate further the role of inconsis­
tencies in schematic processing, a second experiment was 
performed with two incongruent (and two congruent) items.
The peripheral consistent and inconsistent conditions were 
not repeated, since Experiment 1 showed, as predicted, that 
they are neither memorable nor do they have an effect on 
processing of prior schematic information.
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Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate the reliability 
and generality of the finding that a highly incongruent fact 
improved memory of the original schematic information, with 
the exception of the schema label, as found in Experiment 1. 
In addition to repeating conditions with a single highly 
congruent and a single highly incongruent item, conditions 
with two highly congruent and two highly incongruent items 
were introduced. With two highly incongruent items, the 
proportions of schema consistent and schema inconsistent 
information would be equal, excluding the label. We hoped to 
learn from this condition more about the role of the label, 
and whether schematic processing might be disrupted when 
there was as much counterevidence as supporting evidence, 
pursuing interest in the limits on schematic processing —  
or, as it might turn out, in the perseverance of schematic 
processing in the face of disconfirming information.
No peripheral items were included, because Experiment 1 
DEHAIMTROTED, as predicted, that the congruency of items 
that are not critical to the schema is immaterial. Only 
immediate recall was tested. Thus there were five within
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subjects conditions in Experiment 2; One Core Consistent 
(+1C); One Core Inconsistent (-1C); Two Core Consistent 
(+2C); Two Core Inconsistent (-2C); and Neutral. The design 
and execution of the experiment were essentially the same as 
in Experiment 1, although the materials were modified 
slightly.
There were two alternative hypotheses for the effect of 
two incongruent items on processing of the initial schematic 
information. On the one hand, it could be expected that two 
incongruent items would disrupt schematic processing. If 
so, a character presented in that condition would be less 
memorable than the others, and recall of the label would be 
affected. Recall of other items associated with characters 
in the -2C condition would be random, rather than being 
organized by the schema. In that case, recall of the 
initial core facts would be superior for the conditions with 
only highly congruent items, in which schematic processing 
could be expected to persist, than for the condition with 
two highly incongruent facts.
Alternatively, on the basis of Hastie's (1980) model, 
one might predict that two incongruent items would produce 
even higher levels of recall of the two supporting facts 
than a single incongruent item. The introduction of two 
items requiring elaborative processing might induce two 
retrievals of preceding schematic information from long term 
memory, resulting in more interepisode linkages than intro-
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duction of a single incongruent item would produce. There 
would also be one more incongruent item to which the pre­
viously introduced congruent items could be connected.
flethod 
Subj.eg-t-S
Subjects were 100 students (50 females and 50 males) 
from an introductory psychology course participating in 
partial fulfillment of a course requirement or for extra 
credit. Requirements for participation were residence in a 
university dormitory for at least one semester during the 
preceding two years (1980-1982), age of 21 or less, and 
native speaker fluency in English.
Design and Materials
The design was a 2 (Consistent/Inconsistent) X 2 (One 
Second Fact/Two Second Facts) repeated measures factorial.
Materials were modified in three ways from Experiment
1. First, in order to create the conditions with two highly 
consistent or inconsistent items in the second information, 
the fourth ranking core fact was used in addition to the 
first. These items were not identical with those used in 
Experiment 1, however, because of a change in the calcu­
lation of cue values.
The second change is that one of the factors in the for­
mula used to calculate cue value was modified. The measure 
of distinctiveness was previously defined as the number of
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times an attribute was assigned to another stereotype cate­
gory. Cue value was recalculated, weighting distinctiveness 
just as the measure of association was weighted: by multi­
plying the frequency by the mean rank assigned to the attri­
bute for a stereotype. With this modification, an attribute 
that was frequently associated with a stereotype and was 
infrequently associated with other stereotypes, but was 
given high ranks in regard to the other stereotypes, would 
have a lower cue value than previously, and might exchange 
final ranking with another attribute that was more 
frequently listed under other stereotypes but was rated as 
less important to those stereotypes.
Two additional changes in the materials were made on 
the basis of observations stemming from a study on ster­
eotype categories conducted in the interim. Norming proce­
dures for this study revealed that the "Greek" (fraternity 
member) stereotype was no longer in the top five, having 
been replaced by a "Preppy" stereotype, one of whose core 
characteristics was membership in a fraternity; and the 
drug-using "Freak" had become a "Druggie". The new stereo­
types and their attributes are given in Appendix D.
For this study, there were five assignments of stereo­
types to conditions, and 10 orders of presentation of condi­
tions, resulting in fifty different stimulus sets. Twenty- 
five tape recordings were made, one for each character in 
each condition. Each unique combination of stereotypes.
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conditions and orders was heard by two subjects.
Procedure
Subjects were run in pairs. As in Experiment 1, they 
were told they would hear descriptions of five OU students 
and answer questions about them. They heard the first 
paragraph containing a name, year in college, stereotype 
label and two core consistent facts, then answered the two 
questions estimating typicality. They then heard an addi­
tional consistent fact (+1C); two additional consistent 
facts (+2C); an inconsistent fact (-1C); two inconsistent 
facts (-2C); or a neutral fact (N). Two more irrelevant 
details about the character followed. After hearing all the 
information, subjects responded to the typicality estimates 
again. Each subject heard five tapes, one in each condi­
tion, then performed a surprise recall task. The experiment 
lasted about 25 minutes.
Results and Discussion
Three separate 2 X 2  repeated measures analyses of 
variance were performed on the data, one for each of the 
dependent measures: recall of the label, recall of the two
supporting core facts in the first information, and recall 
of the one or two consistent or inconsistent items in the 
second information.
Recall Ql Label
A single significant effect was obtained in recall of 
the label: the label was recalled more often in the incon-
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sistent conditions than in the consistent conditions, F(l, 
98)=4.2, MSe=.1339/p <.05. Mean recall of the label in the 
inconsistent conditions was 82%, and in the consistent con­
ditions it was 74%. This finding contrasts with the results 
of Experiment 1, in which there were no differences in 
recall of the label by condition. The label now shows the 
same effect exhibited by the two supporting facts in Experi­
ment 1. (See Figure 2.)
Recall Af ÏK& Supporting Facts
There was also a significant main effect of consistency 
for the two critical target items in the first information. 
When there was highly inconsistent information in the second 
paragraph, recall of the original consistent items was 
superior (x=1.185) to conditions in which consistent infor­
mation followed (x=1.03), F(l, 98)=5.4219, MSe=.4431,p<.05. 
This finding (shown in Figure 3) is parallel to Experiment 
1, replicating the finding of a facilitating effect on 
recall of the two supporting facts when followed by a single 
highly inconsistent item, and extending it to the case of 
two highly inconsistent items. Two inconsistent items did 
not facilitate recall of the two supporting facts more than 
a single inconsistent item, as predicted from Hastie's 
model, nor did they inhibit schematic processing as was 
alternatively predicted.
Second Facts
As in Experiment 1, analysis of this variable was
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confounded because target items in the second information 
were not held constant across conditions. Furthermore, in 
Experiment 2 there were one or two second facts, and recall 
was converted into proportions for the statistical analysis.
There was a single significant main effect. One 
fact was recalled proportionately more frequently (x=.74) 
than two (x=.53), F(l, 98)=30.7439, MSe=.1334, p<.001. Thus 
the finding in Experiment 1 of superior recall of the highly 
congruent item was not replicated.
Of the two alternative outcomes projected for Experiment 
2, the pattern of results best fits the predictions from 
Hastie's (1980) model; highly incongruent items signifi­
cantly facilitated recall of the schematic information.
Both the label and the two supporting facts were affected. 
However, additional facilitation from two incongruent facts 
compared to one incongruent fact was expected from Hastie's 
model but was not found.
There was no reliable difference in recall of the core 
inconsistent and consistent items themselves. This finding 
is not necessarily incompatible with Hastie's (1980) des­
cription. When there are equal numbers of congruent and in­
congruent items, incongruent items are less unusual and 
therefore deemed less informative than when they are infre­
quent. On the other hand, highly congruent items receive 
elaborate processing because of their informativeness. This 
deep processing of core consistent items in the second
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information would render them memorable, but would not 
affect recall of the original schematic information.
As in Experiment 1, the results are more compatible with 
Hastie's model than with alternative predictions, yet the 
data are not a perfect fit with Hastie's model. Hastie's 
model generally predicts superior recall of schematic infor­
mation when followed by incongruent information, and this 
facilitation was replicated in Experiment 2. Two incon­
gruencies did not produce more facilitation of the two 
supporting facts than one incongruency, but an increase in 
the effect is manifested in a different way: the schema
label, which was unaffected by incongruency in Experiment 1, 
shows facilitation in the incongruent conditions in Experi­
ment 2. Results from both experiments will be considered in 
the light of the models, and a modified model accomodating 
all the findings will be proposed in the concluding chapter.
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Conclusions
In the introduction, the question was raised, why, if 
information incompatible with our beliefs is so salient and 
memorable, are we not constantly in a state of cognitive 
change? In a similar vein, Walter Lippmann, who coined the 
term stereotype, observed "There is nothing so obdurate to 
education or to criticism as the stereotype," (1922). The 
data presented here might provide an answer to Clore's 
(1982) puzzle and a cognitive processing explanation for 
Lippmann's observation. The reason, we may infer from these 
data, that stereotypes and other schemas resist disconfirma- 
tion is that the effect of presenting evidence against their 
accuracy or validity is to strengthen the beliefs on which 
they rest, and to enhance memory for evidence supporting 
their validity.
In noting the resistance of schemas to change, and the 
resistance of people to abandoning an inappropriate schema, 
Taylor and Crocker (1981) suggested several possible 
underlying "liabilities" of schematic processing, 
such as the interpretation of neutral information as 
supporting evidence and the failure to encode (peripheral 
inconsistent) aspects of the stimulus configuration
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which are incompatible with expectations. They may have 
been correct that both these processes have a role under 
some conditions but in the absence of ad hoc research and a 
specific processing model, their account did not include 
additional processes suggested by the current research which 
result in raaintainance of an inappropriate schema.
The next question, then, is: what sort of model of
schematic processing does this research support? The model 
must account for schematic processing, in the sense of 
providing a role to expectancies and a mechanism for the 
imposition of schematic organization on new information.
This explanation should include a description of the func­
tion and behavior of the label. The model should also 
account for the effects of incongruencies on the schema, and 
for the effects of different retention intervals.
It will be argued that Hastie's (1980) model can 
account for most of the effects found here yet his model 
does not provide a mechanism for implementing effects of the 
schema itself. Smith and Graesser's (1981) proposal, in 
contrast, provides a model of the schema, but cannot account 
for processing effects. In order to develop a model that 
can account for all the effects, first a list of the current 
findings with implications for modeling will be given; then 
the adequacy of available models to account for each of 
these effects will be evaluated; and, finally, a proposal 
for a comprehensive model will be made.
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Findings to be Modeled
The primary findings that must be accounted for simul­
taneously by a model are the following;
1. The schema plays a role in the organization of 
information at encoding: highly relevant items, both
consistent and inconsistent, are remembered better than 
peripheral or neutral items; and highly inconsistent items 
are recognized as such.
2. The introduction of highly incongruent information 
facilitates recall of previously introduced congruent infor­
mation, under both immediate and delayed recall conditions 
and whether there are one or two pieces of disconfirming 
information. Two incongruent items are not more facilita­
ting than a single incongruent item.
3. All items decay at the same rate, with the exception 
of the schema label.
4. The schema label appears to be affected by subse­
quent information only when there are conditions in which 
the number of pieces of disconfirming evidence is equal to 
the number of pieces of supporting evidence, as compared to 
conditions in which there is more supporting than discon­
firming evidence.
Adequacy of Available Models
The schema plays a role in organization of the informa­
tion at encoding. It is necessary to posit that this organi­
zation of information according to the schema takes place at
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encoding rather than at retrieval if we are to attribute the 
facilitating effect of incongruent information on schematic 
information to a review of previously stored information; 
the incongruent information must be recognized as such at 
encoding. Therefore, some set of expectancies must be 
called up from long term memory (conceptual or semantic 
memory) when the schema is activated. In the experiments 
conducted here, we can assume the schema is activated by the 
schema label. In other research on person memory, it is 
assumed to be activated by the initial trait ensemble, or by 
the impression formation task given after introduction of 
the traits.
Although activation of the schema is assumed in 
Hastie's model, and its origin is given as conceptual 
memory, the schema is not mechanically represented in his 
model, and has no further role. In Smith and Graesser's 
model, the schema is mechanically represented by a pointer 
to semantic memory and has a role in retrieval. Although we 
have considered borrowing this mechanism and incorporating 
it into a model resembling Hastie's, what information is 
under the pointer and what information is tagged is problem­
atic. Experiment 1 suggests that only the label, not all 
schematic information, is under the pointer, because the 
label does not decay as rapidly as other types of informa­
tion and is unaffected by subsequent information, conforming 
exactly to Smith and Graesser predictions for information
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under the pointer. In Experiment 2, however, the prediction 
breaks down. The label is affected by subsequent informa­
tion. A second problem with adopting Smith and Graesser's 
representation is posed by other results of Experiment 1.
In their model, core incongruent, peripheral incongruent, 
and neutral items would all be labelled 'atypical' and 
tagged onto the memory trace. Yet we find that core (con­
gruent and incongruent items are remembered better than 
peripheral (congruent and incongruent) items.
The second process to be explained is the effect of the 
introduction of different levels of congruence on the 
initial schematic information. This effect was of primary 
interest in the current research. Because the finding of 
superior memory of schematic information when followed by 
highly incongruent information was predicted from Hastie's 
model, we have generally adopted a network associational 
approach. However, this model in the form presented by 
Hastie is unable to account for the absence of significantly 
better recall of the facilitating incongruent item itself, 
in Experiment 1. It is also unable to account for the 
equivalent facilitation from one and two incongruent items 
in Experiment 2.
Recall of the label was not affected by subsequent 
incongruencies or by delay in Experiment 1. We can account 
for the absence of an effect of delay or other variables in 
Experiment 1 by hypothesizing that it is the label alone to
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which Smith and Graesser's pointer and generic schema infor­
mation description applies. All other information would 
decay at the same rate because all linkages decay at the 
same rate. As suggested above, it might be just the label 
that is under the pointer and within the generic schema 
block. Such information quite conceivably could be invul­
nerable to manipulations. Yet obviously the label is not so 
invulnerable since it was recalled reliably more often when 
followed by inconsistent information in Experiment 2.
Looking to Hastie's model for an alternative explana­
tion, we might suppose that in Experiment 1, where there was 
a single truly disconfirming item in one out of five stereo­
types, only the two supporting facts were reviewed in trying 
to construct a causal attribution for the incongruent item; 
but in Experiment 2, w h e r e  there w as a total of three highly 
incongruent items in two out of five stereotypes, the label 
itself was retrieved and possibly called into question. As 
anecdotal support to this supposition, several subjects in 
the second experiment audibly reviewed the label on hearing 
the two inconsistent items, or questioned the experimenter. 
Subjects in the first experiment were not driven to such 
displays. Although this supposition may be essentially 
correct, it is not captured in Hastie's representation. All 
items are already connected to the subject node and linkages 
do not have differential strengths. Therefore, retrieval of 
the label from long term to working memory when two incon-
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gruent items are introduced could establish no more or no 
stronger linkages between the subject node and other items 
than would exist otherwise.
It seems then, that neither of the two models under 
consideration can perfectly account for the current data. 
However, they provide partial predictions and close approxi­
mations from which an adequate model can be constructed. 
Modified Model
The first problem is that to account for the appro­
priate evaluation of relevance of core and peripheral items 
in Experiment 1, the vaguely referenced "expectancies" must 
be represented. In keeping with Hastie's approach, we pro­
pose that the schema be represented by a network retrieved 
from conceptual memory to working memory upon introduction 
of the label in the experiments. This network has as its 
subject node the same or a similar label as the experimental 
stimulus. Under the subject node of the conceptual network 
are "expectancy nodes", which might be visualized as 
unfilled spaces corresponding to highly associated attri­
butes. Core attributes will pertain to these expectancy 
nodes, but peripheral and neutral items entering working 
memory will not. Thus linkages between the subject node and 
core consistent items will be provided by the network from 
conceptual memory.
The network from conceptual memory may have essentially 
the same effect as Smith and Graesser's pointer to generic
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schema information. It might be possible, then, to modify 
the script-pointer + tag model to accommodate the findings 
about schematic organization in Experiment 1. It has been 
noted here that the first organizational distinction at 
encoding is between relevant and irrelevant information, 
rather than between congruent and incongruent information, 
as Smith and Graesser suggest. This distinction could be 
captured in their model if, instead of placing moderately 
typical (peripheral consistent) tags under the generic 
information and atypical tags under the memory trace, highly 
atypical (core inconsistent) items were tagged under the 
schema and the irrelevant items (peripheral and neutral) 
were tagged under the memory trace.
Turning to the second issue, the modified Smith and 
Graesser model can provide an account of the effect of core 
incongruencies on recall of the initial information. They 
would play precisely the role hypothesized for peripheral 
congruent items in the introduction; by tagging the infor­
mation under the pointer, incongruencies would render the 
generic schema information more memorable.
However, it becomes problematic, under this modified 
model, to account for the absence of effect of incongruen­
cies on the label in Experiment 1. This finding also pre­
sents problems for Hastie's model, but Smith and Graesser's 
model has two additional problems: it posits all-or-none
accessing of information under the pointer, which clearly
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w as not found here, and it posits more rapid decay of tagged 
items than schematic items. The latter premise was not 
supported by interactions in analysis of immediate and 
delayed recall.
Modifications of Hastie's model are more easily 
accomplished to bring it in line with the current data. 
Tracing the process from the beginning, when the label is 
introduced, the schema is retrieved from conceptual memory. 
The two core facts in the first information instantiate two 
of the expectancy nodes, and the network is stored in long 
term memory. When another highly relevant and consistent 
fact is introduced in the second information, it is simply 
added to this memory trace as an additional instantiation; 
because this item easily "fits" the expectancy, prior infor­
mation is not reevaluated. When a core inconsistent fact is 
introduced in the second information, the two supporting 
facts are retrieved from event memory, as Hastie describes, 
and causal reasoning takes places in an effort to understand 
the incongruent item. According to Hastie, during this 
elaboratjve processing, the incongruent item becomes linked 
to all other items and thereby facilitates their retrieval. 
The problem with this explanation is that it predicts 
superior recall of the incongruent item, which was not found 
here or in several other studies. A possibility is that 
during this reconsideration of the schematic information, 
the two supporting facts become linked to each other. These
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new linkages would represent the "integration" of schematic 
information suggested earlier. Retrieval of the two sup­
porting facts would then be improved because of but not via 
the core inconsistent item.
The difference between the findings in Experiment 1 and 
Hastie's findings could then be explained in terms of dif­
ferences in the relationship of the highly incongruent 
item(s) to the subject node, due to differences in the 
experimental procedures used here and those used elsewhere. 
Here, the subject node was clearly the label. Subjects were 
not required to learn the characters' names, and did not 
store the information under the fictitious names. In 
Hastie's experiments, long lists of attributes were 
presented about a single character at a time (recall was 
tested after each character). For Hastie's subjects, then, 
the subject node may well have been the character's name, 
and the incongruent behaviors may have been linked to the 
subject node as well as to other congruent behaviors. In 
Experiment 1, the incongruent item may not have been linked 
to the subject node with which it was inconsistent, but was 
linked to the two supporting facts retrieved from event 
memory. A core consistent item, whether appearing in the 
initial or second information, could be accessed from the 
subject node through a linkage established in conceptual 
memory, but a core inconsistent item would not. This con­
ceptualization, in contrast with Hastie's, is represented in
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Figure 4.
An advantage of the proposed modified representation is 
that it can also account for the fact that two incongruent 
items do not facilitate recall of the two supporting facts 
more than a single incongruent item. If access to the con­
gruent items depends on their linkages to incongruent items, 
as under Hastie's model, they should be twice as likely to 
be reached with two incongruent items. However, if the 
incongruent item serves to establish linkages between the 
congruent items, additional incongruencies could add 
nothing. This explanation might also apply to a finding of 
Hastie's, over which he expressed puzzlement. When Hastie 
and Kumar (1979) varied proportions of congruent and incon­
gruent items, recall of incongruencies was affected, but 
recall of congruent items was unaffected. Hastie (1980) 
mentions that he is unable to account for the absence of set 
size effects on recall of congruent items.
The third finding to be modeled is that all items decay 
at the same rate, with the exception of the label. The 
network associational model can easily accommodate this 
finding. Hastie's model predicts that all items decay at 
the same rate, but also that information is accessed through 
the subject node, a concept similar to Smith and Graesser's 
'all-or-none' access. If nothing else about the character 
is recalled, it is likely that the label will be recalled, 
but if anything else about the character is recalled (with
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the exception of recall of a single core inconsistent fact 
only), it is likely that the label would be recalled.
The final problem is deriving a post hoc explanation for 
the facilitating effect on recall of the label of one or two 
incongruent items in Experiment 2, when the label was not 
affected in Experiment 1. We have suggested earlier in this 
discussion that when subjects are frequently hearing discon­
firming information, as in Experiment 2, the label is 
retrieved along with the two supporting facts. Hastie's 
model is unable to account for the facilitating effect of 
this additional consideration of the label, since under his 
model the subject node is already connected to all addi­
tional items. Under the modified model, however, the single 
core inconsistent item in Experiment 1 is connected to the 
two supporting facts, but is not linked to the label. We 
can then suppose that when the counterevidence is so strong 
that the subject not only tries to explain the incongruency 
but also questions the categorization and therefore 
retrieves the label, as in Experiment 2, the inconsistent 
item becomes linked to the label in working memory. Under 
Hastie's principle that recall is a function of the number 
of linkages to an item, the subject node will be more likely 
to be retrieved in the inconsistent than the consistent 
conditions (see Figure 4).
In summary, the model proposed to account for the endur­
ing qualities of schemas, expectancies and prejudices is
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similar to Hastie's network associational model, but adds a 
sort of network map from conceptual memory to represent the 
schema in working memory and explain its apparent normative 
role in encoding and retrieval. This schematic network 
assures that supportive evidence will generally be available 
from the subject node. The advantages of Hastie's model are 
retained, allowing for the representation of highly relevant 
but inconsistent items within the network in episodic 
memory, as opposed to other schematic models, such as Smith 
and Graesser's, which retain the schema as a rigid entity 
within episodic memory. With a modification of Hastie's 
depth of processing mechanism, the model can account for the 
facilitating effect of incongruent items without requiring 
the highly disputed superior recall of incongruent to con­
gruent items. Instead of accounting for the high recall of 
additional core consistent items by Hastie's somewhat 
unsatisfying proposal of elaborative processing of "quintes- 
sentially characteristic" items, it is accounted for by a 
tacit schematic network from conceptual memory, and the 
direct linkage of core consistent items with the subject 
node. This proposal also resolves Hastie's puzzle about the 
absence of set size effects on congruent items.
As Fiske and Linville (1980) have noted, the problem 
with schema theory is that it lacks a model. They also 
point out that an advantage of schema theory as a basis of 
modeling cognitive processes is that it incorporates both
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structure and process in a single theory. However, subse­
quent attempts provide a model for schema theory have 
focused on the schema structure (as in Smith and Graesser's 
model) or have accounted for the dynamic processes (as in 
Hastie's model). In this research, in looking for the 
answer to an old question about the stubborn, apparently 
irrational, persistence of mental habits, an attempt was 
made to find a model which would incorporate a conceptual 
schema into a processing model.
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Appendix A 
Stimuli for Experiment 1
Stereotype frames:
Jesus Freak
Bill Norris is a freshman. He has been called a Jesus 
Freak. He passes out pamphlets. He goes to church every 
Sunday.
Bill...He is from Norman. Be is nineteen.
Freak
John Innis is a sophomore at O.D. He is considered a freak. 
He goes to rock concerts. He wears torn jeans and a t- 
shirt.
John...He is from Tulsa. He is of average height.
Greek
Richard Dana is a senior at O.U. He is a Greek. He wears 
Izod shirts and topsider shoes. He keeps up with the latest 
fashions.
Richard...He is from Lawton. He has brown hair.
Jock
Peter Smith is a junior. He is a jock. He is big. He 
wears gym shorts a lot.
Peter...He is from Oklahoma City. He likes Mexican food. 
Brain
Jim Cravens is a second semester freshman. He is the smart 
type. He studies constantly. He carries a large stack of 
books with him.
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Jim...He lives in the dorms. He eats in the cafeteria.
Items creating five conditions: 
j£fiU£ -Er^ ak
Core Consistent: Bill always carries a bible.
Core Inconsistent: Bill never carries a bible.
Peripheral Consistent: Bill is polite
Peripheral Inconsistent: Bill is rude
freak
Core Consistent: John enjoys mind altering drugs.
Core Inconsistetn: John never touches drugs.
Peripheral Consistent: John is easy going.
Peripheral Inconsistent: John is uptight.
Greek
Core Consistent: Richard likes preppy clothes.
Core Inconsistent: Richard doesn't like preppy clothes.
Peripheral Consistent: Richard likes to party.
Peripheral Inconsistent: Richard doesn't like to party.
Jock
Core Consistent: Peter is extremely muscular.
Core Inconsistent: Peter is not very muscular.
Peripheral Consistent: Peter is not very interested in
school.
Peripheral Inconsistent: Peter is interested in school.
Brain
Core Consistent: Jim has a 4.0 GPA.
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Core Inconsistent: Jim is on academic probation.
Peripheral Consistent: Jim enjoys time alone.
Peripheral Inconsistent: Jim doesn't like to be alone.
Neutral (same for all stereotypes):
X had a midterm last week.
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Appendix B 
Experimental Instructions and Materials 
Instructions JLa subjects
After signing a consent form, subjects were told: "I
am going to play descriptions of five OU students and ask 
you questions about them, so I just want you to listen,"
The first half of the tape w a s  played, and the subject was 
handed an estimate sheet (sample included in this appendix) 
with four questions. The experimenter then said, "I want 
you to answer the first t wo questions by circling one of the 
numbers," and pointed at the numbers aligned vertically 
under question 1, and horizontally under question 2.
As soon as the subjects had answered the two questions 
(before they had time to read the next two), the experimen­
ter said: "Now I'm going to play more information about the
same person," and restarted the tape recorder. When the 
tape was finished, the experimenter said: "Now I want you
to answer the next two questions. You can answer them the 
same w a y  as the first time, or you can answer them d i f f e r ­
ently." As soon as the subjects finished, the estimate 
sheets were collected. The experimenter said, "I'm going 
to play a description of another student." Again, after the 
first half of the biography, the subject was handed an 
estimate sheet, and asked to "answer the first two ques­
tions." After two biographies, it was not necessary for the 
experimenter to repeat instructions. The subject listened
6 6
to the tape, was handed the estimate sheet, held onto it 
while hearing the second half of the biography, then turned 
it in after answering the second two questions. Before the 
fifth biography, the experimenter said, "This is the last 
one. "
After the fifth estimate sheet had been turned in, the 
experimenter said: "Now I want you to write down everything
you remember about these five people. This is called a sur­
prise recall task. I have five recall sheets; each one has 
the name of one of the characters at the top. I'll give 
them to you one at a time in the same order as the descrip­
tions." The experimenter continued, "It doesn't matter so 
much whether you get the right name with the right person as 
that you try to remember all five people and write five 
separate descriptions, so that we can tell which one you are 
talking about." Subjects were given five recall sheets, one 
at a time. Recall sheets were taken only when the subject 
voluntarily returned it. They were not permitted to go back 
to an earlier sheet and add to it once they had handed it 
in.
W h e n  they had turned in five recall sheets, they were 
asked "Is there anyone you were unable to remember but has 
come back to you? If so, w e  have a sixth recall sheet with  
no name that you can use to write down another description." 
Most subjects did not want the sixth sheet. Some wanted it 
to add on to a description they had already given and were
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told, "It's just for another whole person." Some subjects 
who had returned a blank recall sheet were able to add a 
biography that they had not been able to remember in the 
correct order (or what they believed to be the correct 
order).
Subjects in the delayed recall condition heard 
essentially the same instructions, but left the first day 
after turning in the fifth estimate sheet, and heard the 
recall instructions on returning two days later, after an 
introductory statement, "Remember the five OU students you 
heard descriptions of the other day?" Subjects in Experi­
ment 2 heard the same instructions as subjects in the imme­
diate recall condition of Experiment 1,
6 8
Exam ple o f  " E stim a te"  r e s p o n s e  form ;
1 . How t y p i c a l  o f  u n d e r g r a d u a te s  a t  0 0  i s  Mark I n n is ?
e x tr e m e ly  t y p i c a l  
2
v e r y  t y p i c a l
3
f a i r l y  t y p i c a l
4
som ewhat t y p i c a l
5
n o t  v e r y  t y p i c a l
6
n o t  a t  a l l  t y p i c a l
2. What i s  t h e  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  t h e  s tu d e n t  p o p u la t io n  a t  00  
t h a t  i s  l i k e  Mark I n n is ?
75% 60% 45% 30% 15% 5%
Your a n s w e r s  t o  t h e  q u e s t io n s  b e lo w  m ig h t n o t  a g r e e  w i t h  th e  
a n s w e r s  a b o v e .
3 .  How t y p i c a l  o f  u n d e r g r a d u a te s  a t  00  i s  Mark I n n is ?
1
e x tr e m e ly  t y p i c a l  
2
v e r y  t y p i c a l
3
f a i r l y  t y p i c a l
4
som ewhat t y p i c a l
5
n o t  v e r y  t y p i c a l
6
n o t  a t  a l l  t y p i c a l
4 . What i s  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  s t u d e n t s  a t  0 0  t h a t  i s  l i k e  
Mark I n n is ?
75% 60% 45% 30% 15% 5%
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Example of recall response sheet;
Write down everything you remember about Mark Innis.
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APPENDIX C 
ANOVA Tables for Experiment 1
Rpeall o£ thm Lahal
S o u r c e DF Sum o f  S q u a r es Mean Square F -R a t io Prob
GP* 1 0 .2 8 1 7 0 .2 8 1 7 1 .0 2 2 1 0 .3 1 4 6 6
SS GP 148 4 0 .7 8 6 7 0 .2 7 5 6
C l* * 1 0 .0 0 1 7 0 .0 0 1 7 0 .0 0 6 8 0 .9 3 2 2 0
C l GP 1 0 .3 7 5 0 0 .3 7 5 0 1 .5 2 5 8 0 .2 1 6 2 4
SS GP Cl 148 3 6 .3 7 3 3 0 .2 4 5 8
CP*** 1 0 .1 3 5 0 0 .1 3 5 0 0 .4 9 2 9 0 .5 0 9 1 6
CP GP 1 0 .0 8 1 7 0 .0 8 1 7 0 .2 9 8 2 0 .5 9 2 6 4
SS GP CP 148 4 0 .5 3 3 3 0 .2 7 3 9
C l CP 1 0 .0 0 1 7 0 .0 0 1 7 0 .0 0 8 8 0 .9 2 2 6 6
C l CP GP 1 0 .6 0 1 7 0 .6 0 1 7 3 .1 6 3 7 0 .0 7 3 6 4
SS GP Cl CP 148 2 8 .1 4 6 7 0 .1 9 0 2
CORRECTION FACTOR 2 0 7 .6 8 1 7
Recall af Two Supporting Pacta
S o u r c e DF Sum Of S q u a r es Mean Square F - r a t i o Prob
GP 1 2 0 .5 3 5 0 2 0 .5 3 5 0 3 1 .0 9 6 6 0 .0 0 0 0 1 *
SS GP 148 9 7 .7 3 3 3 0 .6 6 0 4
Cl 1 0 .6 0 1 7 0 .6 0 1 7 1 .3 0 7 5 0 .2 5 3 3 8
Cl GP 1 0 .0 4 1 7 0 .0 4 1 7 0 .0 9 0 6 0 .7 6 1 6 8
SS GP CP 148 6 8 .1 0 6 6 0 .4 6 0 2
CP 1 0 .1 3 5 0 0 .1 3 5 0 0 .2 3 8 6 0 .6 3 1 7 0
CP GP 1 0 .8 8 1 7 0 .8 8 1 7 1 .5 5 8 4 0 .2 1 1 2 9
SS GP CP 148 8 3 .7 3 3 3 0 .5 6 5 8
CP Cl 1 1 .6 0 1 7 1 .6 0 1 7 4 .1 5 7 8 0 .0 4 0 6 3 *
CP Cl GP 1 0 .1 3 5 0 0 .1 3 5 0 0 .3 5 0 4 0 .5 6 1 9 4
SS GP CP Cl 148 5 7 .0 1 3 0 0 .3 8 5 2
CORRECTION FACTOR 6 3 4 .4 8 1 7
*G P »lm m e6iate  v s .  D e la y
* * C I - C o n s is t e n t  v s .  I n c o n s i s t e n t
***C P -C ore v s .  P e r ip h e r a l
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Appendix C. ANOVAS for Experiment 1, cent.
R e c a ll . jQf S eco n d  F a c t
S o u rce DP Sum o f  S q u a r es Mean Square F -R a t io Prob
GP 1 4 .1 6 6 7 4 .1 6 6 7 1 2 .8 1 3 4 0 .0 0 0 7 8 *
SS GP 148 4 8 .1 2 6 6 0 .3 2 5 2
Cl 1 1 .3 0 6 7 1 .3 0 6 7 5 .6 2 7 2 0 .0 1 7 9 4 *
Cl GP 1 0 .3 2 6 7 0 .3 2 6 7 1 .4 0 6 8 0 .2 3 5 6 0
SS GP Cl 148 3 4 .3 6 6 7 0 .2 3 2 2
CP 1 7 .7 0 6 7 7 .7 0 6 7 4 2 .0 4 6 7 0 .0 0 0 0 0 *
CP GP 1 0 .1 6 6 7 0 .1 6 6 7 0 .9 0 9 3 0 .6 5 6 2 5
SS GP CP 148 2 7 .1 2 6 6 0 .1 8 3 3
Cl CP 1 0 .4 2 6 7 0 .4 2 6 7 2 .5 8 7 3 0 .1 0 5 8 1
Cl CP GP 1 0 .1 6 6 7 0 .1 6 6 7 1 .0 1 0 6 0 .3 1 7 4 8
SS GP Cl CP 148 2 4 .4 0 6 6 0 .1 6 4 9
CORRECTION FACTOR 1 1 9 .7 0 6 7
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Appendix D 
Stimuli used in Experiment 2
Stereotype Frames:
Druggy
Mark Innis is a junior. He is a druggy. Bis eyes are often 
blood-shot. He goes to rock concerts.
Mark...He is twenty. He has a sister.
Preppy
William Cole is a senior. He is a preppy. He belongs to a 
fraternity. He is sometimes snobbish.
William...He is from Norman. He is twenty-one.
Jock
Bob Louis is a sophomore. He is a jock. He is a big guy.
He has a cocky manner.
Bob...He has brown hair. He is nineteen.
Brain
Brad Richards is in his third semester. He is a brain. He 
studies most of his free time. He always carries a lot of 
books.
Brad...He is from Oklahoma City. He has a brother and a 
sister.
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Jesus Freak
Sam Carlson is a freshman. He is very religious. He always 
carries a bible. He goes to church every Sunday.
Sam...He is eighteen. He has a brother.
Items creating conditions for each stereotype:
Pcuggy
1 Consistent: Mark wears old jeans and t-shirts.
2nd Consistent: He has long hair.
1 Inconsistent: Mark wears dress slacks and shirts to
class.
2nd Inconsistent: Be has short hair.
Preppy
1 Consistent: William wears alligator shirts and dock-
siders.
2nd Consistent: He is concerned with being in style.
1 Inconsistent: William wears overalls without a shirt.
2nd Inconsistent: He is careless about his appearance.
Jock
1 Consistent: Bob is muscular.
2nd Consistent: He wears gym shorts to class.
1 Inconsistent: Bob is physically weak.
2nd Inconsistent: He wears a coat and tie to class.
Brain
1 Consistent: Brad has a 4.0 GPA.
2nd Consistent: He usually wears glasses.
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1 Inconsistent; Brad has a 2.0 GPA.
2 Inconsistent: He is vain about his appearance.
£i.eaK
1 Consistent: Sam passes out pamphlets on the South Oval.
2nd Consistent: He doesn't drink or party.
1 Inconsistent: Sam never talks about religion.
2nd Inconsistent: He likes to drink and party.
Neutral (Same for all Stereotypes)
X had an exam last week.
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Appendix E
ANOVA Tables for Experiment 2
Reea 11 af r.ahpl
S o u rc e DF Sum o f  S q u a r es  Mean S q uare
Cl* 1 0.5625 0.5625
SS Cl 98 13.1250 0.1339
OT* 1 0.2025 0.2025
SS OT 98 18.4850 0.1886
Cl OT 1 0.0625 0.0625
SS Cl OT 98 16.6850 0.1703
CORRECTION FACTOR 241.8025
ZHD SupportiD O  f a c t a
S o u rc e DF Sum o f  S q u a r es Mean S q uare
Cl 1 2.4025 2.4025
SS Cl 98 43.4250 0.4431
OT 1 0.0625 0.0625
SS OT 98 55.1850 0.5631
Cl OT 1 0.0025 0.0025
SS Cl OT 98 51.0450 0.5209
CORRECTION FACTOR 490.6225
Second Pacts as Proportions
S o u rc e DF Sum o f  S q u a r es Mean S q uare
Cl 1 0.0056 0.0056
SS Cl 98 14.9312 0.1524
OT 1 4.1006 4.1006
SS OT 98 13.0712 0.1334
Cl OT 1 0.0306 0.0306
SS Cl OT 98 16.3918 0.1673
CORRECTION FACTOR 160.6556
F -R a tio  Prob  
4.20000 0.04054*
1.0736 0.30321
0.3671 0.55312
F -R a t lo  Prob  
5.4219 0.02068*
0.1110 0.73908
0.0048 0.94326
P -R a tio  Prob  
0.0369 0.84228
30.7439
0.1831
0.00001*
0.67342
* C I « C o n s is te n t  v s .  I n c o n s i s t e n t  se c o n d  f a c t ( s )
**OT“One v s .  Two se c o n d  f a c t s
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T a b le  1
A t t r i b u t e  s t r u c t u r e  f o r  f i v e  s t e r e o t y p e s  i n  E x p er im e n t  1
CATEGORY: ALL Jesus Freak Freak Greek Jock Brain
CUE VALUE? 
Core Mean 84 89 81 77 81 92
Peripheral
Mean 34 41 22 39 31 36
Grand mean 60 65 59 58 56 64
Range 12-120 18-97 12-110 32-98 13-115 22-120
Summary data on cue values for five stereotypes
tCue value = (frequency of association of an attribute with 
a stereotype) x (mean rank) - (frequency of 
association with other stereotypes)
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T a b le  2
Mean r e c a l l  f o r  t h r e e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e s  i n  E xp er im e n t  1
Recall Interval 
Immediate Delay M
Dependent Variable 
Label:
Core Consistent .61
Core Inconsistent .60
Peripheral Consistent .56 
Peripheral Inconsistent .67 
Neutral .60
Two Supporting Facts:
Core Consistent 1.16
Core Inconsistent 1.37
Peripheral Consistent 1.19 
Peripheral Inconsistent 1.13 
Neutral 1.09
Second Fact:
Core Consistent .69
Core Inconsistent .56
Peripheral Consistent .41 
Peripheral Inconsistent .45 
Neutral .29
.53
.55
.65
.53
.55
.76
.88
.88
.85
.97
.57
.41
.29
.17
. 0 5
.57
.57
.61
.60
.57
.96
1.13
1.03 
.99
1.03
.63
.49
.35
.31
. 1 7
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T a b l e  3 .
Mean r e c a l l  f o r  t h r e e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e s  i n  E xp er im e n t  2
Number of Second Items 
One Two M
Dependent Variable
Label:
Consistent .73
Inconsistent .78
Neutral 
Two Supporting Facts:
Consistent 1.04
Inconsistent 1.21
Neutral 
Second Fact(s):
Consistent .73
Inconsistent .74
Neutral
.75
.85
1.01
1.17
.55
.52
.74
.82
.77
1.03
1.19
1.24
.64
.63
.29
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Figure 1
Mean reca ll o f two supporting fac ts  in  Experiment 1, 
collapsed across immediate and delayed reca ll conditions.
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Figure 2
Percent recall  o f  stereotype label in Experiment 2
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Figure 3
Mean recall  o f  two supporting facts  in Experiment 2
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S u b j e c t  n o d e
Representation o f  re lationsh ips among subject node, congruent 
items, and incongruent items according to H astie's  (1980) model
Congruent item
Incongruent item
Representation o f  re la tionsh ips among subject node, congruent 
items and incongruent item (s) according to proposed modified 
model
Figure 4
Representations o f  e f f e c t  o f  introduction o f  incongruencies  
in network models
83
